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MUST PHYSICIANS DISCLOSE AN ALCOHOL OR 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE PROBLEM WHEN REQUESTING A 
PATIENT SIGN AN INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT? 
SAMUEL D. HODGE, JR.,* DIANE BEYERS,** AND KAYLA B. THOMAS*** 
Addiction isn’t about substance - you aren’t addicted to the 






A number of physicians suffer from drug abuse or alcoholism.  This 
indiscretion presents complex medical/legal issues ranging from the loss of 
a physician’s license or hospital privileges to claims for medical 
malpractice or battery.  Most jurisdictions mandate that colleagues report 
physicians with an abuse problem to the appropriate medical board.  In an 
informed consent context, there has been a push to expand those things that 
must be disclosed, including doctor-specific issues such as the physician’s 
lack of experience, health issues involving the doctor, success rates for the 
procedure, and the doctor’s HIV-positive status.  However, scholars 
disagree on whether physicians have an affirmative duty to divulge their 
alcohol or substance abuse to a patient.  While a number of them argue for 
disclosure, the courts for the most part have not found it to be a material 
risk that must be discussed when securing the patient’s informed consent. 
This article will discuss the implications of alcohol and drug abuse among 
physicians and whether patients have a viable cause of action for a doctor’s 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
John Norman was a talented surgeon with unbridled energy and 
intellectual abilities.  He graduated first in his class, worked long hours, and 
only accepted the most challenging cases.  His storied career, however, 
came crashing down when he was arrested for soliciting drugs from an 
undercover police officer.  An investigation discovered that he had a long 
standing addiction to cocaine and oxycodone.  Dr. Norman’s hospital 
privileges were suspended, but that was only the beginning of his troubles. 
A number of patients with poor surgical outcomes have since sued the 
physician claiming he had an obligation to disclose his drug addiction 
before they signed their informed consent forms.  They assert that receiving 
such information was an important consideration in their decision to 
undergo surgery.  This article will discuss the implications of alcohol and 
drug abuse among physicians and whether patients have a viable cause of 
action for a doctor’s failure to disclose his or her alcohol or drug addiction 
in the context of the informed consent document. 
II. THE PROBLEM 
Physicians are perceived as immune to the temptations of daily life. 
After all, they preach the virtues of a healthy lifestyle and understand the 
dangers of drug and alcohol abuse.  This thought process, however, is 
flawed.  One out of ten doctors will succumb to alcohol or drug misuse 
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during their careers,2 and 7% of doctors are active substance abusers.3  This 
risky behavior has not been the subject of a lot of public scrutiny since 
doctors take the utmost care to safeguard their professional images, and 
their addiction is usually not discovered until it is well-advanced.4  
Physicians also enjoy a lofty social position filled with many rewards, but 
this elevated status creates an obstacle when they suffer from addiction, 
thereby delaying any intervention to overcome the problem.5  This delay6 is 
frequently due to the potentially career-destroying outcomes of disclosure,7 
as society has zero tolerance for drug use by health care professionals.  
Most patients accept “only abstinence for any practicing physician.”8 
III. RISK FACTORS 
There is no simple explanation as to why physicians become addicted 
to alcohol or drugs, but there are a few acknowledged risk factors.  A 
number of doctors with addiction have grown up in dysfunctional families, 
have been exposed to physical or emotional abuse, or have had a disruption 
in their family unit while young children.9  Also, medical schools fail to 
provide students with sufficient information about the high potential for 
 
2. Patrick J. Skerrett, Doctors Aren’t Immune to Addiction, HARVARD MED. SCHOOL (Nov. 
16, 2012), http://www health harvard.edu/blog/doctors-arent-immune-to-addiction-20121116553 
8.  
3. Roger S. Cicala, Substance Abuse Among Physicians: What You Need to Know, HOSP. 
PHYSICIAN, July 2003, at 39-46, http://www.turner-white.com/pdf/hp_jul03_know.pdf.  One study 
estimated that doctors are 30 to 100 times more likely to become dependent on narcotics than the 
general population.  Ryan P. Ethridge, “What Is And What Should Never Be” Privileged In North 
Carolina: The Peer Review Privilege After Armstrong v. Barnes, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1750 n.66 
(2007) (citing Richard D. Aach et al., Alcohol and Other Substance Abuse and Impairment Among 
Physicians in Residency Training, 116 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 245, 246 (1992)). 
4. Keith H. Berge et. al., Chemical Dependency and the Physician, 84 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 
625, 625 (2009), http://www mayoclinicproceedings.org/article/S0025-6196%2811%2960751-9/ 
pdf.  Depending on which drug is abused, it can take years until a physician’s behavior changes 
enough to be indicative of a substance abuse problem.  See Cicala, supra at note 3, at 39. 
5. Berge et. al., supra note 4, at 625. 
6. The American Medical Association’s Code of Ethics mandates that when a doctor 
becomes aware of a personal health issue that could impair his or her job performance, that 
physician has a duty to self-report.  Nevertheless, few doctors follow this requirement. 
Michael M. Miller, Warning Signs of Physician Alcohol Impairment, AM. MED. NEWS (Aug. 6, 
2012), http://www.amednews.com/article/20120806/profession/308069933/5/. 
7. Doctors Vulnerable to Prescription Drug Abuse, PHYSICIAN HEALTH PROGRAM (Feb. 20, 
2014), http://www.physicianhealthprogram.com/addiction-news/doctors-vulnerable-to-rescription-
drug-abuse. 
8. Kimberly Gold & Scott Teitelbaum, Physicians Impaired by Substance Abuse Disorders, 
J. OF GLOBAL DRUG POL’Y AND PRAC., Summer 2008, at 1, http://www.globaldrugpolicy.org/ 
Issues/Vol%202%20Issue%202/Physicians%20Impaired%20by%20Substance%20Abuse%20Dis
orders.pdf.  
9. Cicala, supra at note 3, at 40. 
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addiction within the medical field.10  This is a significant omission since 
physicians experience the same genetic predispositions, influences, and 
pressures as the general population who suffer from drug and alcohol 
dependency. 
There is, however, one complicating difference that can increase the 
desire to use these substances: physicians face a more stressful work 
environment than the average person, filled with long, demanding hours 
and high numbers of patients in the work place, as well as emergency calls 
after work.11  Physicians who are more comfortable prescribing medications 
have also been shown to be at greater risk for abusing stronger drugs.12  
These risk factors are exacerbated since medication is readily available to 
physicians, and some doctors self-prescribe for long periods without 
detection.13  The AMA Code of Medical Ethics also discourages doctors 
from self-treating themselves,14 so an addicted physician may ask a 
colleague to order their medication.  Failing that option, doctors have stolen 
drugs from the hospital dispensary and their patients.15  Again, this mirrors 
the habits of other drug abusers.  It is not surprising, then, that this segment 
of the health care industry has a higher rate of prescription drug abuse than 
the average population.16 
 
10. Shelly Reese, Drug Abuse Among Doctors: Easy, Tempting, and Not Uncommon, 
MEDSCAPE (Jan. 29, 2014), at 4, http://www medscape.com/viewarticle/819223_1.  While 
medical school education on substance abuse has improved during the past twenty or thirty years, 
there continues to be a failure of properly trained faculty to teach the subject matter.  Marc 
Galanter, Herbert D. Kleber & Kathleen T. Brady, The American Psychiatric Publishing Textbook 
of Substance Abuse Treatment, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N ch. 50 (5th ed.), 
http://psychiatryonline.org/ doi/book/10.1176/appi.books.9781615370030.  This perpetuates the 
failure of medical school curriculums to adequately address drug and alcohol abuse when 
compared to other chronic health issues.  Id.  
11. Why Do Doctors Get Addicted to Drugs and Alcohol, PHYSICIAN HEALTH PROGRAM, 
http://www.physicianhealthprogram.com/why-doctors-get-addicted (last visited Apr. 25, 2016). 
12. Id.  In 1973, a seminal paper was published on drug use by physicians and their resultant 
impairment.  Catalina I. Dumitrascu, Philip Z. Mannes, Lena J. Gamble & Jeffrey A. Selzer, 
Substance Use Among Physicians and Medical Students, 3 MED. STUDENT RES. J. 26, 27 (2014), 
http://msrj.chm msu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/MSRJ-Winter-2014-Substance-Use-
Among-Physicians-and-Medical-Students.pdf.  The paper, The Sick Physician, was published in 
1973 and stressed the need to treat physicians who suffer from drug and alcohol abuse and led to 
the creation of physician health programs.  Id.  
13. Why Do Doctors Get Addicted to Drugs and Alcohol, supra note 11; see also Gold & 
Teitelbaum, supra note 8, at 2. 
14. Ericka L. Adler, Physicians and Self-Prescribing: Just Say ‘No’, PHYSICIANS PRAC. 
(Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.physicianspractice.com/blog/physicians-and-self-prescribing-just-
say-%E2%80%98no%E2%80%99 (last visited March 28, 2016). 
15. See Keith H. Berge et. al., Diversion of Drugs Within Health Care Facilities, a Multiple-
Victim Crime: Patterns of Diversion, Scope, Consequences, Detection, and Prevention, 87 MAYO 
CLINIC PROC. 674, 674-75 (2012), http://www ncbi nlm nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3538481/. 
16. Cicala, supra note 3, at 41.  Three medical specialties have the highest rate of drug abuse: 
emergency room physicians, psychiatrists, and anesthesiologists.  Kent Sepkowitz, The Secret 
World of Drug-Addict Doctors?, DAILY BEAST, April 24, 2014, http://www.thedailybeast.com/ 
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One differing factor, however, is that physicians who abuse drugs or 
alcohol are rarely trying to obtain a “quick high”; rather, they are 
attempting to diffuse the extraordinary stresses and demands of their 
profession or are trying to deal with physical pain or mental illness.17 
Addicted individuals are also twice as likely to develop mood or anxiety 
disorders.18  This comorbidity, the infliction of two or more disorders or 
illnesses affecting the same person, may serve to worsen the physician’s 
untreated addiction or mental illness.19  Since physicians are knowledgeable 
in the use of drugs, their work performance is usually the last thing affected 
by a drug or alcohol impairment.20  This fact contributes to a physician’s 
general denial that he or she has an addiction problem.21 
Interestingly, the man dubbed the father of surgery in the United States 
created most of his surgical improvements while under the influence of 
cocaine or morphine;22 William Stewart Halsted, the renowned professor of 
surgery at Johns Hopkins, developed an interest in new anesthetics, which 
led to his downfall.23  Cocaine was one of the most effective anesthetics at 
the time, and after personally testing the drug on several occasions, he 
became addicted.24   Dr. Halsted quickly developed the telltale signs of drug 
 
articles/2014/04/24/the-secret-world-of-drug-addict-doctors html.  Another study found that illicit 
drugs were favored by emergency medicine doctors, and benzodiazepines were used the most by 
psychiatrists.  Patrick H. Hughes et. al., Physician Substance Use by Medical Specialty, 18 J. OF 
ADDICTIVE DISEASES 23, 24 (1999).  On the other hand, pediatricians had the lowest rate of 
substance abuse, and anesthesiologists had a higher rate of opiate use.  Id.  Interestingly, 
psychiatrists and emergency room physicians had the highest rate of self-reporting of their 
substance abuse, while surgeons ranked the lowest.  Id. 
17. Amy Norton, Stress Leads Some Doctors to Abuse Prescription Drugs, Study Shows, 
HEALTHDAY, http://consumer healthday.com/mental-health-information-25/addiction-news-6/str 
ess-leads-some-doctors-to-abuse-prescription-drugs-study-says-681021 html (last updated Oct. 11, 
2013).  According to a study on drug use by physicians, most of the doctors questioned indicated 
that they “did not use prescription drugs recreationally.”  Doctors Vulnerable to Prescription 
Drug Abuse, supra note 7.  “Instead, the majority reported using them to manage stress.”  Id. 
18. Drug Facts: Comorbidity: Addiction and Other Mental Disorders, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG 
ABUSE, https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/comorbidity-addiction-other-mental-
disorders (last updated Mar. 2011).  
19. Id. 
20. A study authored by two physicians at Johns Hopkins recommended that hospitals should 
randomly test its health care professionals for drugs and alcohol abuse to improve patient safety. 
All Hospitals Should Require Drug, Alcohol Tests for Physicians, JOHNS HOPKINS MED., May 7, 
2013, http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/news/media/releases/all_hospitals_should_require_drug_ 
alcohol_tests_for_physicians.  
21. Gold & Teitelbaum, supra note 8, at 2. 
22. Addicted to Drugs, Yet the Greatest American Surgeon Ever, GOOD NEWS NETWORK 
(Sept. 22, 2012), http://www.goodnewsnetwork.org/americas-greatest-surgeon-and-his-dark-
secret-revealed-2/.   
23. Id. 
24. Abigail Zuger, Traveling a Primeval Medical Landscape, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2010), 
http://www nytimes.com/2010/04/27/health/27zuger html?_r=0. 
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addiction: he routinely made up excuses, lied, and missed time from his 
employment.25 
These certain signs are general indicators of a physician’s impairment. 
Other signs include missing or being late for work on a frequent basis, a 
sloppy appearance, taking extra time for meals, extended absences during 
work hours, mood swings and irritability, as well as the inability to interact 
with others.26  An impaired doctor may also change employment on a 
regular basis as a way to avoid detection, and they may have extramarital 
affairs, gambling issues, and financial difficulties.27  These physicians are 
even known to work longer hours in the hospital as their addiction 
intensifies, since it is a means for closer access to drugs and covering up 
abnormal behavior.28 
IV. SUBSTANCES OF CHOICE 
In a five-year study of physicians with addiction problems, alcohol was 
abused in 50.3% of the cases, opioids were the drug of choice 35.9% of the 
time, stimulant use happened in 7.9% of the occasions, and other substances 
accounted for 5.9% of the remaining statistics.29  This irresponsible conduct 
is a significant risk factor for medical malpractice claims, the loss of 
referrals by other physicians,30 destruction of the family unit, as well as the 
onset or continuance of physical and psychological illness.31  The public is 
also at risk as an impaired physician is most dangerous while at work.  For 
instance, a single health care professional who diverts drugs can harm a 
multitude of people.  This is demonstrated by a hospital employee who was 
discovered injecting himself with pain medication and substituting saline 
for the drugs he diverted.32  The worker transmitted hepatitis to forty-six 
people, and 8000 patients had to be tested for liver disease.33  A patient may 
also receive the wrong medication because the physician has diverted the 
correct drug for personal consumption, thereby exacerbating the patient’s 
poor health.  Another consequence of this risk-taking behavior is that a 
 
25. Id. 
26. Cicala, supra note 3, at 43 
27. Id.  
28. Cicala, supra note 3, at 42. 
29. Berge et. al., supra note 4, at 625. 
30. See Ethridge, supra note 3, at 1755-56. 
31. Cicala, supra note 3, at 39. 
32. Peter Eisler, Doctors, Medical Staff on Drugs Put Patients at Risk, USA TODAY (Apr. 
17, 2014, 5:08 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/04/15/doctors-addicted-
drugs-health-care-diversion/7588401/. 
33. Id. 
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physician who has a substance abuse problem is more likely to commit a 
major medical error.34 
V. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 
Alcohol and substance abuse by physicians presents a number of 
complex legal issues.  A claim for malpractice is an obvious outcome but 
not the only one.35  In addition, a medical facility must immediately remove 
the addicted physician from seeing patients,36 and substance or alcohol 
abuse creates an ethics violation.  A variety of pronouncements on the issue 
have been made by medical organizations or the government.  For instance, 
the American Medical Association’s Opinion 8.15 provides: “It is unethical 
for a physician to practice medicine while under the influence of a 
controlled substance, alcohol, or other chemical agents which impair the 
ability to practice medicine.”37 
A.  LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO THE IMPAIRED PHYSICIAN 
States have a valid interest in making sure physicians do not misuse 
drugs and other substances that can impair their abilities.38  Most 
jurisdictions, therefore, mandate that doctors report other physicians with an 
abuse problem to the Board of Medicine.39  A number of legislative 
schemes also provide immunity to those who, in good faith, report the 
offending physician.40 
Some jurisdictions even take a remedial approach in lieu of immediate 
disciplinary action.  For instance, Washington provides that “if the 
disciplining authority determines that the unprofessional conduct may be 
the result of substance abuse, the disciplining authority may refer the 
license holder to a voluntary substance abuse monitoring program approved 
 
34. Shelly Reese, Drug and Alcohol Abuse: Why Doctors Become Hooked, MEDSCAPE, 
(May 6, 2015), at 2, http://www medscape.com/viewarticle/843758_1. 
35. One study ascertained that doctors who acknowledged making a significant medical 
mistake during a ninety-day period under review had a greater tendency to suffer from depression 
or struggle from alcohol or drug dependence.  Sarah Haston, Note, Impaired Physicians and the 
Scope of Informed Consent: Balancing Patient Safety with Physician Privacy, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 1125, 1133 (2014). 
36. Berge, et. al., supra note 4, at 626. 
37. AMA CODE OF MED. ETHICS Opinion 8.15 - Substance Abuse (AM. MED. ASSOC. 1986). 
38. Med. Soc’y of N.J. v. Herr, 191 F. Supp. 2d 574, 583 (D.N.J. 2002). 
39. Douglas Mossman & Helen M. Farrell, Physician Impairment: When Should You 
Report?, CURRENT PSYCHIATRY, Sept. 2011, http://www.currentpsychiatry.com/home/article/ 
physician-impairment-when-should-you-report/b96b78e7be21952839fac3aef998fbb8 html (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2016). 
40. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.130.175 (West 2016) (granting immunity from 
civil liability for persons who report drug abuse problems in good faith). 
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by the disciplining authority.”41  Likewise, Arizona maintains a confidential 
program for the treatment and rehabilitation of the addicted physician, 
which includes “education, intervention, therapeutic treatment and 
posttreatment monitoring and support.”42 
In actuality, the impaired physician is most often referred to the 
appropriate authority by a family member or law enforcement official,43  
though this referral can be delayed by the family.44  This delay is often due 
to the family attempting to preserve their economic status.45  Once the 
substance abuse issue becomes public knowledge, however, attempts are 
made to delve into the doctor’s drug or alcohol use in order to establish a 
malpractice claim.46  Informed consent documents are also challenged on 
the basis that the physician had a duty to disclose his or her history of 
alcohol or drug abuse. 
B. INFORMED CONSENT 
Informed consent is deeply engrained in American jurisprudence47 and 
signifies “the right to bodily integrity.”48  The doctrine is premised on 
shared decision-making49 and was created to help counteract the imbalance 
of power in the doctor-patient relationship. “[R]equiring physicians to 
provide more information to their patients . . . help[s] to redress the power 
imbalance problems created by the inequality of knowledge.”50  In fact, it 
creates an independent cause of action, and a physician may incur liability 
 
41. Id.  These programs tend to be more rigorous than addiction treatment programs for lay 
people.  For instance, they can last ninety days, which is three times longer than the average 
program, and are shown to help approximately 80% of the physicians recover successfully.  
Skerrett, supra note 2. 
42. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-1452 (2016). 
43. Gold & Teitelbaum, supra note 8, at 1.  
44. Berge et. al., supra note 4, at 625. 
45. See id.  This procrastination in reporting can be detrimental.  The findings from one study 
demonstrated that a third of physicians who had committed suicide have had a substance abuse 
problem at some point in their lives.  Merry Miller, K. Ramsey McGowen & James H. Quillen, 
The Painful Truth: Physicians Are Not Invincible, 93 S. MED. J. 966 (2000), http://www med 
scape.com/viewarticle/410643, at 2. 
46. See Watson v. Chapman, 540 S.E.2d 484, 487-88 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001); Ornelas v. Fry, 
727 P.2d 819, 823 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); Armstrong v. Barnes, 614 S.E.2d 371, 373-74 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2005); Gustafson v. Chambers, 871 S.W.2d 938, 941 (Tex. App. 1994). 
47. The idea for informed consent originated in the guidelines to the Nuremburg Code, 
which was created after World War II to guarantee that unethical medical experimentation was 
never performed again in the name of science.  Bryan Murray, Informed Consent: What Must a 
Physician Disclose to a Patient?, 14 AMA J. OF ETHICS 563, 563 (2012).  
48. Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 500 (Wis. 1996). 
49. Murray, supra note 47, at 563. 
50. Haston, supra note 35, at 1127-28. 
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for failing to obtain proper informed consent, even if the treatment rendered 
is proper and reasonable.51 
The American Medical Association has even made informed consent a 
basic tenant for the practice of medicine.  Ethics Rule 8.12 provides: 
It is a fundamental ethical requirement that a physician should at 
all times deal honestly and openly with patients.  Patients have a 
right to know their past and present medical status and to be free of 
any mistaken beliefs concerning their conditions.  Situations 
occasionally occur in which a patient suffers significant medical 
complications that may have resulted from the physician’s mistake 
or judgment.  In these situations, the physician is ethically required 
to inform the patient of all the facts necessary to ensure 
understanding of what has occurred.  Only through full disclosure 
is a patient able to make informed decisions regarding future 
medical care.52 
Informed consent has the greatest applicability to surgeons, and the 
American College of Surgeons notes that the doctrine is more than just a 
legal requirement.53  They state it is a standard for ethical surgical practice 
that augments the physician/patient relationship and has the ability to 
improve the patient’s care and treatment results.54  Accordingly, surgeons 
must tell each patient about his or her illness and the plan for treatment.55 
The information must be presented fairly, accurately, and com-
passionately.56  At a minimum, the surgeon should discuss: 
1. The nature of the illness and the natural consequences of no 
treatment. 
2. The nature of the proposed operation, including the estimated 
risks of mortality and morbidity. 
3. The more common known complications, which should be des-
cribed and discussed.  The patient should understand the risks as 
well as the benefits of the proposed operation.  The discussion 
 
51. Stewart-Graves v. Vaughn, 170 P.3d 1151, 1155 (Wash. 2007).  Informed consent is not 
required in all cases.  For instance, consent will be implied in an emergency situation where 
immediate action is necessary to protect life.  Id. 
52. AMA CODE OF MED. ETHICS Opinion 8.12 - Patient Information (AM. MED. ASSOC. 
1994). 




56. Id.  
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should include a description of what to expect during the 
hospitalization and post-hospital convalescence. 
4. Alternative forms of treatment, including nonoperative tech-
niques. 
5. A discussion of the different types of qualified medical pro-
viders who will participate in their operation and their respective 
roles.57 
Most states have some form of informed consent laws, but the exact 
requirements differ among jurisdictions.58  The overall theme is one of 
patient empowerment; informed consent laws mandate healthcare providers 
to inform the patient, without being asked, about the material facts, benefits, 
risks, and alternatives to the procedure and to secure that person’s written 
authorization before going forward with treatment.59  As noted in Matthies 
v. Mastromonaco, the healthcare provider is mandated to disclose that 
information which will allow a reasonable patient “to consider and weigh 
knowledgeably the options available and the risk attendant to each.”60  
 
57. Id.  
58. A number of states have incorporated the requirements of informed consent into their law 
by statute. See, for example, 40 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.504 (West 2002), 
which provides:  
(a) Duty of physicians.—Except in emergencies, a physician owes a duty to a patient 
to obtain the informed consent of the patient . . . prior to conducting the following 
procedures:   
(1) Performing surgery, including the related administration of anesthesia. 
(2) Administering radiation or chemotherapy. 
(3) Administering a blood transfusion. 
(4) Inserting a surgical device or appliance. 
(5) Administering an experimental medication, using an experimental device or 
using an approved medication or device in an experimental manner. 
(b) Description of procedure.—Consent is informed if the patient has been given a 
description of a procedure . . . and the risks and alternatives that a reasonably prudent 
patient would require to make an informed decision as to that procedure . . . . 
. . . . 
(d) Liability.— 
(1) A physician is liable for failure to obtain the informed consent only if the 
patient proves that receiving such information would have been a substantial 
factor in the patient’s decision whether to undergo a procedure set forth in 
subsection (a).  
(2) A physician may be held liable for failure to seek a patient’s informed 
consent if the physician knowingly misrepresents to the patient his or her 
professional credentials, training or experience. 
59. Understanding Informed Consent - A Primer, FINDLAW, http://healthcare findlaw.com/ 
patient-rights/understanding-informed-consent-a-primer html (last visited November 15, 2015).  
60. 33 A.2d 456, 460 (N.J. 1999).  In the seminal case of Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 
(D.C. Cir. 1972), the court explained the idea behind informed consent when it noted,  
[T]he patient’s right of self-decision shapes the boundaries of the duty to reveal.  That 
right can be effectively exercised only if the patient possesses enough information to 
enable an intelligent choice.  The scope of the physician’s communications to the 
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The traditional understanding of what constitutes a “material risk” is 
under attack.   Information technology and the ability to discover personal 
information about a physician and increased medical knowledge by 
laypeople has resulted in litigation across the country to expand the things 
that should be disclosed by physicians.  This includes doctor-specific issues 
such as the physician’s lack of experience,61 material health issues,62 
success rates for a procedure,63 HIV-positive status,64 prior lawsuits and 
disciplinary action,65 conduct during surgery,66 the investigational status of 
 
patient, then, must be measured by the patient’s need, and that need is the information 
material to the decision.  Thus the test for determining whether a particular peril must 
be divulged is its materiality to the patient’s decision: all risks potentially affecting the 
decision must be unmasked.  And to safeguard the patient’s interest in achieving his 
own determination on treatment, the law must itself set the standard for adequate 
disclosure. 
Id. at 786-87 (footnotes omitted). 
61. Barriocanal v. Gibbs, 697 A.2d 1169, 1172-73 (Del. 1997), found that a surgeon should 
have told the patient of his failure to perform aneurysm surgery in recent years.  See also 
Goldberg v. Boone, 912 A.2d 698, 716-17 (Md. 2006); Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 
498 (Wis. 1996).  A contrary or narrower approach was reached in Whiteside v. Lukson, 947 P.2d 
1263, 1265 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997), where the court held that a physician’s lack of experience in 
handling a specific procedure was not a material risk that had to be disclosed.  See also Ditto v. 
McCurdy, 947 P.2d 952, 958 (Haw. 1997); Foard v. Jarman, 387 S.E.2d 162, 166-67 (N.C. 1990); 
Howard v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 800 A.2d 73, 82 (N.J. 2002); Johnson v. 
Jacobowitz, 884 N.Y.S.2d 158, 162 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009); Abram v. Children’s Hosp. of 
Buffalo, 542 N.Y.S.2d 418, 419 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); Zimmerman v. N.Y. City Health & 
Hosps. Corp., 458 N.Y.S.2d 552, 554 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983); Duttry v. Patterson, 771 A.2d 1255, 
1259 (Pa. 2001), superseded in part by statute, Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error 
Act, 40 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.504 (West 2002)); Wissell v. Fletcher Allen 
Health Care, Inc., 2014 WL 10321333, at *10 (Vt. Super.). 
62. Hawk v. Chattanooga Orthopedic Group, P.C., 45 S.W.3d 24, 34 (Tenn. 2000) involved 
a surgeon who failed to disclose a disabling hand condition.  The court found that this condition 
was relevant to the question of informed consent.  Id. at 35.  In May v. Cusick, 2001 WL 436286, 
¶ 13 (Wis. Ct. App.), a surgeon had suffered two minor strokes in the past, which were not 
disclosed to the patient.  The plaintiff alleged that the doctor may have suffered ill effects from the 
strokes that affected his ability to operate on her.  Id. ¶ 14.  The court dismissed the lack of 
informed consent claim as a matter of law and noted that the plaintiff failed to show any evidence 
that past minor strokes presented any risk to her.  Id ¶ 20.  They were so remote that “no 
reasonable person would believe it needed to be divulged.”  Id. 
63. In Wlosinski v. Cohn, 713 N.W.2d 16, 20 (Mich. Ct. App.  2005), the court determined 
that a doctor’s success rate in performing kidney transplants did not constitute risk information 
that had to be disclosed to a patient.  See also Aralo v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598, 606-07 (Cal. 1993), 
where the court noted it could not say as a matter of law that a cancer patient’s statistical life 
expectancy information before treatment is material to informed consent. 
64. In Faya v Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 339 (Md. 1993) and Doe v. Noe, 690 N.E.2d 1012, 
1018 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998), the courts held that an HIV-positive physician owes a duty to notify a 
patient of that condition or to refrain from performing the operation. The opposite result was 
reached in K.A.C. v. Bensen, 527 N.W.2d 553, 561 (Minn. 1995) and Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 
1355, 1363-64 (Del. 1995).  
65. In Tsouristakis v. Guerrino, 2007 WL 7314864, at *3 (N.Y. Sup.), the court held that a 
dentist is not obligated to inform a patient that he has been sued by other patients or has been the 
subject of a disciplinary proceeding.  See also Curran v. Buser, 711 N.W.2d 562, 566 (Neb. 
2006), a case where the defendant had been disciplined by the Department of Health and Human 
Services Regulation and Licensure for “unprofessional conduct,” and his surgical privileges had 
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a device being used,67 the duty to disclose that patient is part of a research 
project,68 as well as the physician’s financial interest in a procedure.69  If 
the health care provider fails to provide the correct information and 
proceeds with the procedure, the physician has committed battery, and the 
patient does not have to show negligence in order to recover.70  As one 
court explained, 
Unlike an informed consent case where it must be shown that as a 
result of the recommended treatment, the patient actually suffers 
an injury the risk of which was undisclosed . . . it is not necessary 
for a plaintiff to prove such specific medical findings under a 
theory of battery.71 
“[I]t is the conduct of the unauthorized procedure that constitutes the 
tort.”72  
What then is the law regarding a physician’s duty to disclose alcohol 
and drug abuse in an informed consent context?  Legal scholars disagree on 
 
been limited for 1 year.  The court noted that under its informed consent law, such a disclosure 
was not required in order to establish the appropriate standard of care.  Id. at 570. 
66. In Richard v. Colomb, 916 So.2d 1122, 1129 (La. Ct. App. 2005), the physician practiced 
a stitching technique separate from the surgery on otherwise healthy fatty tissue.  The court 
determined that this unnecessary practice required additional informed consent.  Id.  
67. Blazoski v. Cook, 787 A.2d 910, 913 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) involved the off-
label use of a medical device approved by the Food and Drug Administration in back 
surgery.  Even though such use was labeled “investigational” by the FDA, that status did not have 
to be disclosed to the patient.  Id. at 920.  Alvarez v. Smith, 714 So. 2d 652, 653 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1998) had a similar ruling.  The FDA’s classification that pedicle screws were experimental 
did not have to be disclosed as part of the informed consent process.  Id.  See also In re 
Orthopedic Bone Screw Products Liab. Litig., 1996 WL 107556, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 1996). 
68. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 858 (Md. 2001) and In re 
Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796, 818-19 (S.D. Ohio 1995) stand for the proposition 
that a physician must disclose a research agenda.  A contrary result was reached in Greenberg v. 
Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003), where the 
court declined to extend informed consent to medical research and stated, 
First, imposing a duty of the character that Plaintiffs seek would be unworkable and 
would chill medical research as it would mandate that researchers constantly evaluate 
whether a disclosable event has occurred.  Second, this extra duty would give rise to a 
type of dead-hand control that research subjects could hold because they would be 
able to dictate how medical research progresses.  Finally, these Plaintiffs are more 
accurately portrayed as donors rather than objects of human experimentation, and thus 
the voluntary nature of their submissions warrants different treatment.  
Id. at 1070-71 (footnote omitted).  
69. In Moore v. Regents of University of Califoria, 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990), the court 
noted that “a reasonable patient would want to know whether a physician has an economic interest 
that might affect the physician’s professional judgment. . . . [A] sick patient deserves to be free of 
any reasonable suspicion that his doctor’s judgment is influenced by a profit motive.”   
70. Duttry v. Patterson, 741 A.2d 199, 202 (Pa. Super. Ct 1999). 
71. Taylor v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 723 A.2d 1027, 1035 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) 
(emphasis omitted) (citation omitted) (quotation marks omitted).  
72. Id. 
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this evidentiary ruling, and only a handful of courts have addressed the 
issue.  For example, a former appellate judge opines 
that under the doctrine of informed consent, a patient must know 
the risks prior to consenting to an operation but the jurisdictions 
differ on what constitutes a material risk.  The enumerated risks of 
surgery infrequently occur but if a physician performs a procedure 
while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, that certainly seems 
to create a material risk that would lead a reasonable patient, if 
informed, to choose another doctor.73 
“This seems more than just a factor in making the decision,” said the 
judge.74  “Addiction and alcohol abuse presents a lot more risk than some of 
the other issues that our courts have said must be explained to the 
patient.”75  A similar conclusion was reached by a plaintiff’s malpractice 
attorney, but his justification for disclosure was premised upon consumer 
empowerment.  Counsel felt that, 
In the competitive business of medicine in the 21st century, 
patients are vigorously pursued as potential consumers of 
healthcare services by insurance networks and systems, hospitals, 
practice groups and physicians.  From the patient’s standpoint, as a 
well-informed consumer, there should be full disclosure and ‘truth 
in advertising and marketing’ regarding any and all factors that 
may be determinative in the patient’s choice of a healthcare 
provider.  Clearly, past or current substance abuse is one of the 
factors to be considered and, therefore, fully disclosed.76 
A professor of law, who is an expert on the rules of evidence, opined that 
[D]rug or alcohol addiction on the part of a professional is an 
important fact to anyone who puts him or herself in a 
professional’s care.  Given the reality that professionals, from 
lawyers, to doctors to police officers do a pathetic job of regulating 
and disciplining their colleagues, anything that adds some 
deterrent to practice by the addicted would be positive.  One might 
 
73. E-mail from the Honorable Richard B. Klein, Arbitrator and Special Master, The Dispute 
Resolution Inst., to authors (Dec. 1, 2015).  Judge Klein is a former member of the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court and the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas.   
74. Id. 
75. Id.   
76. E-mail from Michael Barrett, Partner, Saltz, Mongeluzzi, Barrett, and Bendensky P.C., to 
authors (Dec. 3, 2015).  Mr. Barrett has been named one of the top medical malpractice lawyers in 
the United States. 
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even suggest punitive damages for an addicted physician who, for 
example, operates on a patient without disclosure.77 
A malpractice attorney for the defense, however, argues that a history 
of drug or alcohol abuse is not relevant to those factors “specifically 
germane to surgical or operative treatment.”78  Utilizing the language in 
Kaskie v. Wright79 to support her position, counsel maintains, 
[I]nvalidat[ing] an otherwise proper informed consent document 
because facts personal to the treating physician were omitted 
would create a virtually limitless extension of the concept of 
informed consent.  Moreover, the question of when drug or alcohol 
‘use’ becomes ‘abuse’ or a ‘problem’ is too subjective to be 
considered in the determination of whether informed consent was 
given.  Obviously, a physician who provides treatment or performs 
surgery in an impaired condition will have committed a breach of 
the standard of care and will be potentially liable for injury that 
results.80 
Healthcare providers believe that the tort system in the Untied States is 
broken and has resulted in malpractice premiums that are excessive.81  This 
has caused the practice of defensive medicine that includes unnecessary 
testing, referrals to other doctors, and the refusal to see certain patients.82  It 
is not surprising that they would be against an expansion of the informed 
consent doctrine to include a disclosure of a drug or alcohol problem.  As 
one prominent orthopedic surgeon noted, 
A physician while caring for a patient must be free and 
unburdened from any outside influence, such as substance or 
alcohol abuse, which may affect the delivery of competent medical 
care.  As established by the American Medical Association in 
Opinion 8.15, a physician can never “practice medicine while 
under the influence of a controlled substance, alcohol, or other 
 
77. E-mail from David A. Sonenshein, the Jack E. Feinberg Professor of Litig., Temple 
Univ. Beasley School of Law, to authors (Dec. 9, 2015).  Professor Sonenshein is co-author with 
the late Irving Younger and Professor Michael Goldsmith of the casebook, Principles of Evidence.  
In addition, Professor Sonenshein has co-authored ten other books on Evidence as well as 
numerous articles on the subjects of Evidence and Civil Procedure. 
78. E-mail from Marcy B. Tanker, Of Counsel, Burns White, LLC, to authors (Dec. 2, 2015).   
79. 589 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991). 
80. E-mail from Marcy B. Tanker, supra note 78.   
81. F. Patrick Hubbard, The Physicians’ Point of View Concerning Medical Malpractice: A 
Sociological Perspective on the Symbolic Importance of “Tort Reform’, 23 Ga. L. Rev. 295, 296 
(1989). 
82. Lee Black, Effects of Malpractice Law on the Practice of Medicine, 9 AMA J. OF ETHICS 
437,   437 (2007), http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2007/06/hlaw1-0706 html. 
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chemical agents which impair the ability to practice medicine.”  
Therefore, the personal background, beliefs, practices and opinions 
of a physician that has no demonstrable objective effect on 
competent care delivery should be beyond the purview of the 
informed consent process.83 
C. COURT DECISIONS 
Despite the prevalence of drug and alcohol abuse by some physicians, 
not many cases have been litigated in which these personal shortcomings 
are used in a lack of informed consent context.  The following is a summary 
of the reported cases. 
Ornelas v. Fry dealt with a malpractice claim involving complications 
that developed during an unsuccessful kidney transplant.84  The issue before 
the Arizona Court of Appeals was whether the surgeon exercised the proper 
standard of care in light of his alleged alcoholism.85  The court found that 
while the doctor may have been an alcoholic, there was no evidence that his 
alcohol abuse translated into a breach of the applicable standard of care.86 
Twenty-seven years later, the same court revisited this area of law in a 
case involving the use of drugs by a surgeon.  In Rice v. Brakel, the doctor 
had a prescription drug dependency around the time of the patient’s spinal 
surgery that resulted in probable nerve damage.87  The court found that the 
patient failed to establish a prima facie case for medical battery because he 
consented to the operation.88  In addition, the court noted the patient was 
unable to show that the surgeon had made any misrepresentations that 
involved invasions of the patient’s interests or the extent of harm to expect 
from the procedure.89  A doctor’s disclosure requirements should both be 
related to the applicable medical procedure and to some objective 
community standard of care for performing that procedure.90  The court 
 
83. E-mail from Alexander R. Vaccarro, Professor, Thomas Jefferson Univ., to authors (Dec. 
5, 2015).  Dr. Vaccarro is the Richard H. Rothman Professor and Chair of the Department of 
Orthopedic Surgery at Thomas Jefferson University.  He is also the President of the Rothman 
Institute.  
84. 727 P.2d 819, 820 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).  
85. Id. at 823. 
86. Id.  See also Mitchell v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 348 P.3d 675, 682 (Nev. 
2015) (stating that the doctor’s drug addiction is not an element of the patient’s malpractice claim 
and that legally the doctor’s diminished capacity “doesn’t matter”; “[o]f legal consequence to a 
medical malpractice claim is whether the practitioner’s conduct fell below the standard of care, 
not why”).  
87. 310 P.3d 16, 18 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013). 
88. Id. at 19-20. 
89. Id. at 20. 
90. Id.  
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declined to introduce the following uncertainty into the law of medical 
torts: 
To expand the disclosure requirements under a battery theory . . . 
could require doctors to volunteer personal information on the off 
chance that a patient might later be able to claim it was important 
to effective consent generally—as judged by a lay person.  Patients 
would not have to prove that the information actually was relevant 
to them, that the doctor had breached the relevant standard of care 
in failing to disclose the information, or that they actually had 
sustained a medical injury.  Instead, they would have to establish 
only that the absence of disclosure created a mistake of fact or 
could be considered a misrepresentation that would void their 
consent as a matter of law.91 
The court also rejected the plaintiff’s informed consent claim because he 
failed to present evidence that he would have declined the operation had the 
surgeon’s drug dependency been disclosed.92  The court stated, “Evidence 
that a doctor may have been struggling with a drug or alcohol dependency 
at the time of the plaintiff’s surgery is insufficient to prove a breach of the 
standard of care.”93 
A federal court in Hawaii considered a claim involving a physician’s 
past history of substance abuse and the patient’s catastrophic brain damage 
following surgery performed by that doctor.94  In Domingo by & Through 
Domingo v. Doe, the plaintiffs were unable to provide any evidence that the 
doctor was under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time of surgery or 
that he had used any drugs or alcohol for the past ten years.95  Further, the 
plaintiffs could not show that the doctor’s prior substance abuse influenced 
his performance of the surgery.96 
The Pennsylvania case of Kaskie v. Wright involved a wrongful death 
action in which the decedent’s parents discovered that one of their child’s 
surgeons was an alcoholic and not licensed to practice medicine in 
Pennsylvania.97  The court considered whether the doctrine of informed 




92. Id. at 22 
93. Id. at 22 (citing Ornelas v. Fry, 727 P.2d 819, 823 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986). 
94. Domingo by & Through Domingo v. Doe, 985 F. Supp. 1241, 1243 (D. Haw. 1997). 
95. Id. at 1246. 
96. Id.  
97. 589 A.2d 213, 214 (Super. Ct. Pa. 1991). 
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Matters such as personal weaknesses and professional credentials 
of those who provide health care are the responsibility of the 
hospitals employing them, the professional corporations who offer 
their services, or the associations which are charged with 
oversight.  Their failure to fulfil their obligations in this regard 
becomes a matter of negligence, and it is from them that recovery 
must be sought.98 
In finding for the defendant, the court refused to expand the doctrine of 
informed consent to personal characteristics of the treating physician as 
doing so would extend the doctrine past its original boundaries—
information about the particular procedure—into an area where limitations 
would not be easily definable.99  The court also found that that appellant 
had not established a clear nexus between the injury and the patient’s lack 
of knowledge about all the procedure’s material risks.100 
The Supreme Court of Georgia issued a similar ruling in Albany 
Urology Clinic, P.C. v. Cleveland.101  The court held that absent a patient’s 
inquiry, there is no common law or statutory duty on the part of medical 
professionals to disclose to their patients life factors—in this case, cocaine 
use outside of work—which may be subjectively considered to have an 
adverse effect on the physician’s performance.102  Failure to make such a 
voluntary disclosure was held not to provide a basis for a fraud claim or 
 
98. Id. at 217. 
99. Id.; see also Mau v. Wisc. Patients Comp. Fund, No. 02-0244, 2003 WL 21706407, ¶ 6 
(Wis. Ct. App. July 24, 2003) (holding that the surgeon had no obligation to inform the patient 
about his drug and alcohol abuse history for informed consent because the surgeon was not using 
those substances when he operated on the patient).   Wisconsin’s informed consent law at the time 
required: “Any physician who treats a patient shall inform the patient about the availability of all 
alternate, viable medical modes of treatment and about the benefits and risks of these treatments.”  
Id. ¶ 5 (citing Wis. Stat. § 448.30 (2001-02)).  The law did not require disclosing personal 
physician information that was not relevant to a specific course of treatment. Id. ¶ 6.  Likewise, a 
Louisiana appellate court determined that a doctor’s inability to perform surgery due to an 
impaired physical condition concerns the doctor’s negligence, not the patient’s informed consent.  
Roberts v. Marx, 109 So. 3d 462, 467 (La Ct. App. 2013).  In Roberts, the patient was unable to 
show that the doctor’s vision—which may have been slightly impaired during the patient’s 
vasectomy surgery, which the doctor performed eight days after his own eye surgery—was not 
corrected by the doctor’s use of magnifying glass during the surgery.  Id. at 463, 467. 
100. Kaskie, 589 A.2d at 216-17.  The court also agreed with the trial court’s assessment that 
the statute of limitations had run on appellant’s negligence claim despite appellant’s character-
ization that their lack of knowledge about the doctor’s addiction and licensure status was 
fraudulent concealment.  Id. at 214-16.  Because the appellants knew the child had died, medical 
negligence would have been apparent or easily discoverable at that time, even though the 
appellants had yet to learn about the doctor’s personal and professional characteristics.  Id. at 216. 
See also Duttry v. Patterson, 771 A.2d 1255, 1259 (Pa. 2001) (“[E]vidence of a physician’s 
personal characteristics and experience is irrelevant to an informed consent claim . . . . ”).  
101. 528 S.E.2d 777, 778 (Ga. 2000). 
102. Id. 
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vitiate a patient’s informed consent to create an action for battery.103 
Georgia’s informed consent statute, like that in Pennsylvania, has a 
“reasonably prudent person in patient’s position” standard for material risks 
disclosures.104  Again, the court found that there was no causal nexus 
established between the patient’s consent to treatment, his resulting injury, 
and the physician’s drug use to sustain a claim for battery.105 
The Albany court declared that compelling public policy reasons 
supported its conclusions.106  Because each patient has unique beliefs and 
standards, it would be impossible to define which of a doctor’s life factors 
would be subject to disclosure to the patient.107  In a dissent, one justice 
viewed this rational as irrelevant, reasoning that although drug use is not 
enumerated in Georgia’s informed consent statute, cocaine use is always 
illegal (and can result in the loss of a medical license); thus, this case would 
not become a matter of the patient’s subjective standards and beliefs.108 
Rather, the jury should be authorized to find that the intentional non-
disclosure vitiated the patient’s consent if the jury believed that the 
undisclosed drug use was material to the patient’s decision to accept the 
doctor’s surgery recommendation.109 
In Williams v. Brooker, the Georgia court was confronted with a case in 
which a surgeon had relapsed into alcohol addiction during the patient’s 
period of treatment.110  In finding that the plaintiff failed to state a cause of 
action, the court noted that it could find no decision which found that a 
hospital has a duty to inform a patient that the doctor is a present or past 
alcoholic.111  Nor does a physician have a “common law or statutory duty to 
volunteer information to their patients of ‘unspecified life factors which 
might be subjectively considered to adversely affect the professional’s 
performance.’”112 
Despite these rulings, a Louisiana appellate court reached a contrary 
result. In Hidding v. Williams, the court held that a doctor’s failure to 
 
103. Id. See also Congero v. Sider, 255 A.D.2d 415, 416 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (considering 
a fraud theory that “concealment by a physician or failure to disclose his own malpractice does not 
give rise to a cause of action in fraud or deceit separate from the customary malpractice action”).  
104. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-6.1 (2015). 
105. Albany Urology, 528 S.E.2d at 781.  
106. Id. at 781.  
107. Id. at 781–82.  In Hooks v. Humphries, 692 S.E.2d 845, 848 (Ga. 2010), the court 
expanded on the Albany Urology decision and noted that a doctor “has no duty to voluntarily 
disclose negative information about his personal life to patients.” 
108. Albany Urology, 528 S.E.2d at 783-84 (Carley, J., dissenting).  
109. Id. at 784. 
110. 712 S.E.2d 617, 619 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011).  
111. Id. at 621. 
112. Id. 
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disclose his chronic alcohol abuse vitiated a patient consent to surgery 
because “[his] condition create[d] a material risk associated with the 
surgeon’s ability to perform, which if disclosed would have obliged the 
patient to have elected another course of treatment.”113  The surgeon’s 
medical license had previously been suspended for “habitual or recurring 
drunkenness,” he displayed past bizarre and irrational behavior, and his 
ability to function was impaired and deteriorating according to witness 
testimony.114  Additionally, the district judge found that the surgeon had 
abused alcohol at the time of the patient’s surgery.115  The judge believed 
that the surgeon’s condition presented a material risk to the patient because 
of the increased potential for injury during the surgery.116  Furthermore, had 
the patient known about this condition, he would have chosen alternative 
treatment.117 
The weight of the authority indicates that claims based on a failure to 
disclose drug and alcohol use are often unsuccessful.  It seems most courts 
are unwilling to impose a duty for doctors to inform their patients of current 
or past drug use especially when the applicable state’s informed consent 
statute does not require such a disclosure.  Ultimately, a patient must prove 
that the doctor’s conduct at the time of the medical procedure fell below the 
applicable standard of care and that an injury arose out of that conduct. 
Hidding appears to be the lone exception to these informed consent cases, 
but one may argue the facts of the case allowed for the carve-out finding of 
liability.  In that case, the alcohol abuse seemed to have impacted the 
surgeon’s day-to-day life and decision-making capabilities at the time of the 
surgery, a circumstance that plaintiffs in many cases may be unable to 
prove. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Physicians are not immune to the temptations of daily life and a small 
percentage will succumb to problems with drugs and alcohol abuse. There 
is no simple explanation for this risk-taking conduct, but there are a few 
acknowledged risk factors.  These include growing up in dysfunctional 
families, exposure to physical or emotional abuse, or disruptions in the 
family unit while young children.  The demands made upon physicians are 
more stressful than those of the average person, and it is common for 
 
113. 578 So. 2d 1192, 1196 (La. Ct. App. 1991). 
114. Id. at 1196–97.  
115. Id. at 1198. 
116. Id.  
117. Id. 
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healthcare professionals to work very long and demanding hours in which 
life and death decisions must be made on a frequent basis. 
Alcohol and substance abuse by health care providers presents a 
number of complex legal issues ranging from claims for medical 
malpractice to the loss of a physician’s license.  States have a valid interest 
in making sure physicians do not misuse drugs and other substances that 
can impair their abilities.  Therefore, most jurisdictions mandate that 
doctors report other physicians with an abuse problem to the appropriate 
board of medicine.  In a litigation context, an appropriate inquiry is whether 
the doctor has an affirmative duty to disclose their alcohol or substance 
abuse to a patient under the doctrine of informed consent.  Over the years, 
there has been a push to expand the types of things that must be disclosed 
when securing a patient’s informed consent, including doctor-specific 
issues such as the physician’s lack of experience, material health issues 
involving the doctor, success rates for a procedure, and the doctor’s HIV-
positive status. 
Scholars disagree on whether the doctor has an affirmative duty to 
disclose their alcohol or substance abuse to a patient.  Nevertheless, the 
courts have generally determined that it is not incumbent upon the 
physician to disclose an abuse issue when obtaining the patient’s informed 
consent. 
 
